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Abstract
The state is often conceptualized as playing an enabling role in a country’s economic development—providing public 
goods, such as the legal protection of property rights, while the political economy of reform is conceived in terms of 
bargaining over policy among elites or special interest groups. We document a case that turns this perspective on its 
head: efficiency-enhancing institutional and behavioral changes arising not out of a conscious, top-down program of 
reform, but rather as unintended (and in some respects, unwanted) by-products of state failure. Responses from a survey 
of North Korean refugees demonstrate that the North Korean economy marketized in response to state failure with the 
onset of famine in the 1990s, and subsequent reforms and retrenchments appear to have had remarkably little impact 
on some significant share of the population. There is strong evidence of powerful social changes, including increasing 
inequality, corruption, and changed attitudes about the most effective pathways to higher social status and income. 
These assessments appear to be remarkably uniform across demographic groups. While the survey sample marginally 
overweights demographic groups with less favorable assessments of the regime, even counterfactually recalibrating the 
sample to match the underlying resident population suggests widespread dissatisfaction with the North Korean regime.
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IntroductIon
Models of the political economy of reform, including transitions from socialism, typically begin with 
some bargaining over policy among elites or special interests with heterogeneous preferences (Drazen 
2000, Roland 2000). Such bargaining may delay reform (Alesina and Drazen 1991) or be resolved in 
ways that lead to Pareto-improving changes in government policy: stabilization, liberalization, or other 
structural and institutional reforms such as improved protection of property rights. 
However, early analysts of the transition in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe noted that 
“reform” was not simply a result of top-down changes in policy. Rather, the transition to a market 
economy was also a result of independent changes in the behavior of economic agents that preceded as 
well as followed reform efforts, including the emergence of grey and black markets and even “spontaneous 
privatization” (Fischer and Gelb 1991). Similar processes of “reform from below” have also been observed 
in cases of state failure, such as Somalia, where the collapse of a highly predatory state may have actually 
improved welfare (Leeson 2007; Powell, Ford, and Nowrasteh 2008).
In this paper we analyze a unique survey of refugees to document a similar process in North Korea: 
efficiency-enhancing institutional and behavioral changes that arose not as a result of policy reform but 
as an unintended (and in some respects, unwanted) private response to state failure. We show that these 
market-oriented adaptations were relatively unaffected by both government reforms and their partial 
reversal. 
The North Korean case is of interest because of the state’s particularly rigid form of socialism. 
In the late 1980s the North Korean economy went into a secular decline, accelerated by the break-
up of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc. During the mid-1990s, the country 
experienced one of the most destructive famines of the 20th century (Haggard and Noland 2007). With 
the state unable to provide food through the socialist public distribution system (PDS), small-scale social 
units—households, work units, local party organs, government offices, and even military units—initiated 
entrepreneurial coping behavior, much of it technically illegal, to secure food. 
These adaptations included innovative uses of existing institutions and practices. One example is the 
use of the August 3, 1984 movement, a campaign originally intended to mobilize marginal participants 
in the labor force to employ waste materials for the local production of consumer goods. The August 3rd 
provisions were used both by enterprises to shed workers, particularly women, and by workers, who—for 
a fee—could be classified as August 3rd workers and thereby shift from employment in the planned sector 
to alternative, higher-efficiency activities in the emerging market sector. Thus the program was associated 
with marketization, taking the forms of both involuntary “necessity entrepreneurship” by redundant 
workers and voluntary “opportunity entrepreneurship.” “Market creep” was by no means confined to 
institutions or activities permitted by statute, however, as managers, entrepreneurs, and workers also 
drifted into market activities well beyond the permission and reach of the state. 
Following the peak famine years of roughly 1994–97, the state had to choose between reasserting 
control over the fraying state socialist system and ratifying the process of marketization from below 
through complementary changes in institutions and policy. After some minor adjustments starting 
in 1998, the government launched a poorly designed reform program in July 2002 that nonetheless 
decriminalized some of the coping behaviors that had arisen in the previous decade; among the more 
significant measures were an overhaul of administered prices and wages and the limited introduction of 
material incentives in both the industrial and agricultural sectors (Haggard and Noland 2007). Beginning 
in 2005, the state had second thoughts and began to reverse earlier reforms. Yet as we show, such 
retrenchment did not necessarily reverse the process of marketization that had been set in train during the 
famine period; indeed, we document substantial continuity in market-oriented behavior from the famine 
to the present, regardless of changes in government policy.  
Documenting changes in North Korea’s notoriously closed economy presents formidable challenges 
to researchers.1 One aspect of North Korea’s unhappy history over the past two decades, however, has 
been an exodus of refugees, mostly into China. Researchers have begun to exploit this opportunity, 
as they did earlier with Chinese and Soviet refugees (see Chon et al. 2007; Lee 2007; Kim and Song 
2008; Lee et al. 2008; Chang, Haggard, and Noland 2008, 2009). This paper extends this literature by 
presenting the results from a 2008 survey of 300 North Korean refugees living in South Korea that sought 
to document and understand the process of marketization from below. 
Such surveys are susceptible to two sorts of bias: an intrinsic one involving self-selection and an 
extrinsic one involving unweighted samples. With regard to the first, those who risk trying to leave North 
Korea probably have some otherwise unobserved individual characteristics that differentiate them from 
the rest of the population; these may include more adverse life experiences and more severely truncated 
opportunities, both of which could give rise to behaviors and attitudes that are quite different from the 
population as a whole. The survey presented below may thus accurately capture the views of the refugee 
community in South Korea but may not accurately reflect the experiences of the current North Korean 
population. 
A second, more tractable issue is that the population of refugees may not be demographically 
representative of the resident, nonrefugee population, overrepresenting particular segments of the 
population such as women or people from particular occupational categories. This problem can, in 
principle, be addressed ex post using multivariate techniques, as is done below.  
1. The standard toolkit includes press and nongovernmental organization (NGO) reports that tap into refugees or 
networks of informants within the country itself and documents and data that emanate periodically from the multilateral 
institutions, such as the World Food Program. Visiting delegations also conduct interviews and take controlled tours, but 
exposure is usually confined to officials in Pyongyang—and to official pronouncements—and can provide only highly 
indirect information on economic and social change on the ground.
We begin with a brief description of the sample, which itself suggests a number of interesting 
features of North Korean society. We then turn to the results, focusing on the changing nature of the 
household economy and the consequences of both marketization and top-down reforms. Starting with 
the income side of the household ledger we document the pervasive engagement in market activities, 
particularly in the form of trading. Most striking are new estimates of the extent to which households 
relied on market income; a significant share of respondents report relying on the market for virtually 
all of their income. The household income results are consistent with those for household demand. We 
confirm that the famine was associated with a decline in the state’s role in food provision and a dramatic 
increase in households’ reliance on market purchases. Moreover, we show that this crucial component of 
marketization was not simply an artifact of the famine but has become an enduring feature—a constant—
of the North Korean economy. 
We then consider the effects of government policy on household behavior, drawing on 
questions about changes that occurred both in the wake of the 2002 reforms and the subsequent 2005 
retrenchment. We find that while policy changes had effects at the margin, their magnitude was small. 
There is little evidence that these respondents relied more on the market after the 2002 reforms than they 
did before or that various controls reintroduced beginning in 2005 fundamentally reversed the process of 
marketization. Nor did we find large differential effects across demographic groups, for example, between 
farmers who might have benefited from de facto price reforms and urban consumers. However, there is 
strong evidence that both the reforms and their partial reversal are associated with increasing corruption, 
inequality, and changed attitudes about the most effective pathways to higher social status and income.
SAmple chArActerIStIcS
The results reported in this paper are drawn from a November 2008 survey of 300 North Korean refugees 
living in South Korea. The sample mirrors what is known about the refugee community resident in South 
Korea: The overwhelming majority of the sample is prime-age adults, with just over half between the ages 
of 35 and 50, and a majority of them are women (63.3 percent).2 Residents of the northeast provinces are 
overrepresented, as has been the case with previous surveys conducted in both China and South Korea. 
Most respondents are from North Hamgyong province (50 percent), followed by South Hamgyong 
province (14.7 percent), two provinces in the far northeast of the country. This distribution of responses 
actually makes these provinces somewhat less overrepresented than in earlier surveys, but these provinces 
nonetheless account for only about 23.2 percent of the North Korean population (Smith 2009).3 
2. It should be noted that the refugee community in South Korea may not be representative of all those who have left 
North Korea. For example, an earlier survey conducted in China found that men and women were represented in roughly 
equal numbers (Chang, Haggard, and Noland 2009).
3. There are two main reasons for the overrepresentation of the northeast provinces: These rust belt areas were by consensus 
North Korea’s mandatory education includes a year of kindergarten, four years of primary school, 
and six years of middle school. At the end of compulsory education (age 15–16), students are channeled 
into technical school (2–3 years), college (4 years), or university (4–6 years), and from the latter they may 
go on to pursue postgraduate studies. In our sample, fully 61 percent of the respondents report having 
only a middle-school education, which is approximately equivalent to graduating from high school. 
Another 15 percent report that they have technical school training and 21 percent have college training. It 
is impossible to say whether this distribution of educational attainment belies North Korean claims about 
the extent (not to mention quality) of education, but it is nonetheless revealing.4  
The large number of women in the sample somewhat complicates the occupational status of the 
respondents; fully 52 respondents, or 17.3 percent, reported that they were housewives. If we look 
only at those in the economically active population—excluding housewives, students, and retirees 
(73 respondents, or just under one-quarter of the sample)—the largest category in the workforce was 
laborers (40.1 percent), followed by government workers (18.9 percent), merchants (7.9 percent, with 
nearly two-thirds being women), and professionals, farmers, office workers, soldiers, and others (each 
between 5 and 7 percent).5 The pattern of responses is highly correlated with responses to a question 
about the respondents’ fathers’ occupations, suggesting little occupational mobility, with laborer fathers 
(41.3 percent) and government-employed fathers (21.7 percent) the two dominant categories, and little 
intergenerational movement across categories.
The North Korean regime has conducted a series of classification exercises, dividing the population 
into categories of reliable supporters, basic masses, and “impure class”; these are commonly called the 
“core” (haek-sim-gun-jung), “wavering” (gibon-gye-cheung), and “hostile” (gyo-yang-dae-sang) classes, and 
family background is a key determinant of life in North Korea (Hunter 1999).6 In our sample, the bulk of 
the worst affected by the famine, and their geographical proximity to China makes egress easier relative to other parts of 
North Korea. 
4. A question about the education of the respondents’ fathers suggests at least some increase in educational attainment 
over time: 17 percent report that their fathers had only an elementary education compared with only 1.3 percent of the 
respondents with elementary education in the sample.
5. The small share of farmers in the sample is unusual compared with past surveys. However, 14 percent responded that 
their work unit was a state farm or cooperative and in answer to a different question, 133 respondents— 44.3 percent of 
the full sample—answered that they worked on a state farm or collective. A closer inspection of this group reveals that 54 
of them, just over 40 percent, self-identify as “laborers.” For our purposes, it is useful to separate out this entire group as 
“state farm or collective employees” even though they reflect a variety of different occupational categories (in addition to 
farmers and workers, this group includes 34 housewives, 11 administrative staff [professional, government, office worker/
teacher], 6 merchants, 6 students, 2 soldiers, and 2 “other”). Because of their involvement in state farms and collectives 
and their probable rural location, we would expect them to constitute a distinct group.
6. Core supporters of the government, including party members, enjoy educational and employment preferences; are 
allowed to live in better-off areas; and have greater access to food and other material goods. Those with a hostile or disloyal 
profile, such as relatives of people who collaborated with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation, landowners, or 
those who went south during the Korean War, suffer a number of disadvantages, are assigned to the worst schools, jobs, 
respondents is categorized as wavering (61.7 percent), with 11 percent hostile and 13.7 percent reporting 
that they did not know. Nonetheless, 13.7 percent reported being in the core group, suggesting that even 
privileged political status did not provide benefits adequate to deter migration. There is some evidence 
of a cross-generational downward drift in status, though the classification of respondents is statistically 
indistinguishable from that of their fathers. Taken as a whole, these indicators depict a relatively stagnant 
society, though it is also possible that the relatively low education levels and lack of occupational or 
political mobility reflect the stunted opportunities for those who took the risk to migrate, including as a 
result of their political status. 
A final set of demographic variables of importance are the dates when respondents left North Korea, 
the amount of time they spent abroad before coming to South Korea, and the amount of time they 
have spent in South Korea. The date of exit is crucial in methodological terms, because it determines the 
relevant time frame for all of our retrospective questions about conditions at the time they left North 
Korea.
There is ample variation in the sample in this regard. With respect to time of departure, we have 
an adequate number of respondents to divide the sample in multiple ways. For some purposes it is useful 
to consider what we call the pre- and post-reform subsamples, with those who left in 2003 and after the 
post-reform group. These two groups are almost exactly equal in size. For other questions the pre-reform 
group is divided into a “famine era” group (those who left in 1998 or before, roughly 25 percent of the 
sample) and a “post-famine” group (1999–2002, again 25 percent). Similarly, we can divide the post-
reform group into a “post-reform” group (those who left between 2003 and 2005, 35 percent of the 
sample) and a “post-retrenchment” group (2006 and after, 15 percent). 
The duration of time respondents spent outside North Korea, particularly in South Korea, may also 
be important in shaping attitudes and perceptions.7 Those with the perspective of a long-time refugee 
in a third country or as a resident of South Korea may view North Korea very differently because of the 
tribulations of being a refugee (particularly in China) or socialization to alternative views of the country 
(particularly in South Korea). 
SourceS of houSehold Income
Historically, money and prices played little role in North Korea’s planned economy. Urban residents 
received monthly rations for household goods distributed at nominal prices; workers on agricultural 
and localities, and sometimes wind up in labor camps.
7. By subtracting the date they left North Korea from the date they arrived in South Korea, we can also tell how much 
time respondents spent as refugees in third countries. The sample confirms the difficulties of getting from North to South 
Korea; the modal response was two years and the median three, but nearly 30 percent of respondents spent more than five 
years abroad before getting to South Korea.
cooperatives and state farms retained annual in-kind allotments of food and received a basket of consumer 
goods in return for agricultural output sold to the state at a derisory procurement price. 
The most common work unit classification among the respondents was state-owned enterprise 
(SOE), both for the respondents themselves (22.7 percent) and for spouses (31 percent). In addition, a 
significant share of respondents (10 percent of the sample) worked for the August 3rd unit of an SOE. 
State farms or cooperatives accounted for 14 percent of respondents and 10 percent of spouses, although, 
as we have seen, this underestimates the share of rural population in the survey. Government and party 
offices accounted for 9 and 2 percent, respectively; the army was also represented among the refugees. 
Engagement in private activities, particularly trading, is ubiquitous (table 1).8 More than 70 percent 
of respondents and more than 60 percent of their spouses report that they engaged in trading, magnitudes 
consistent with an earlier survey cited in Kim and Song (2008) and Lee et al. (2008). Also fairly common 
were participation in other private business activities (18.9 percent of respondents and 20.1 percent of 
spouses) and participation in August 3rd units (14.9 percent of respondents and 18.1 percent of spouses) 
even though only 10 percent of the sample and only 2.7 percent of the spouses reported these as their 
primary work units. 
The respondents were asked what share of household income came from private business activities 
at the time they left North Korea, a more accurate indicator of dependence on the market than simple 
engagement in a given activity. The results are staggering (figure 1). Nearly half the respondents reported 
that all of their income came from private business activities at the time they left North Korea. More than 
two-thirds of the respondents—69 percent—reported that half or more of their income came from such 
activities. Only a handful of respondents—4 percent—reported that none of their income came from the 
market. Moreover, there appears to be little difference across the famine, post-famine, post-reform, and 
post-retrenchment periods; dependence on market income was high in all periods, although by the post-
reform and post-retrenchment periods virtually every household received at least some income from the 
market.9 
What is striking about the extent of engagement in the market is its uniformity across the sample 
and along multiple dimensions. Regressions are estimated in two forms: ordered probits on the ordinal 
responses in figure 1 and a simple probit in which the sample is divided between those who received all 
8. The question was whether “in addition to your regular work, did you ever engage in the following activities,” allowing 
them to list all that apply: private trading; providing private services (hairdresser, bicycle repair); other private business 
activity; and August 3rd unit. The inclusion of August 3rd units using this phrasing of the question was designed to catch 
activities outside of regular employ, i.e., the possibility that the respondent was formally working for an SOE and lists it 
as the primary work unit but in fact was working in an August 3rd unit. However, we cannot rule out the possibility of 
double-counting since the questionnaire includes August 3rd units in the main question concerning work unit.
9. The apparent lack of trend is consistent with an earlier survey done largely on refugees who left North Korea before 
either the 2002 reform or the 2005 retrenchment (Kim and Song 2008, Lee et al. 2008).
their income from the market and those who received nonmarket income (table 2). The list of variables 
not robustly correlated with the market component of family income is long. Respondents’ sex, age, year 
or “era” of departure from North Korea, time in South Korea or third countries, educational attainment, 
residence in the capital city, Pyongyang, or in the northeastern provinces of the country, political 
classification, and occupation had no effect on their propensity to engage in market activity. The two 
variables that are robustly correlated with the market as a source of income are residence in a province 
bordering China (which surprisingly was negatively correlated with market income) and work unit.10 The 
excluded group in the regressions was workers in August 3rd units, which we would expect to be the most 
market-oriented group because of the very nature of these enterprises. Regular SOE workers, government 
or party employees, and soldiers were all less likely to receive income from the market than these August 
3rd workers. Agricultural cooperative or state farm workers also received less income from the market 
(regression 2.1), though employment in this sector is not correlated with receiving all income from the 
market (regression 2.2). 
The raw results on sources of household income may reflect overweighting of some demographic 
groups relative to the current North Korean population. In principle, the coefficients reported in table 
2 can be combined with national-level demographic data (see sources in appendix) to derive projected 
values, conditional on the fact that these models have been estimated from a sample of refugees whose 
experiences may not mirror those of the society as a whole. The sample and projected national means, 
along with their 95 percent confidence intervals, are displayed in figure 2. There is little difference 
between the sample values and the projected nationwide results, though the projected nationwide results 
are a bit lower (indicating that our sample overrepresents the most marketized demographic groups), but 
for both specifications the results fall easily within the 95 percent confidence limits. 
While these refugees do not appear unrepresentative in terms of identifiable demographic markers, 
they may be distinctly disaffected and, because of their disaffection, they may have relied more on the 
market than typical North Koreans. Moreover, these individuals might have sought additional sources 
of earnings to finance their exit from the country; income-earning strategies may be endogenous to 
subsequent exit. We can examine this possibility indirectly from the expenditure side. Do we observe 
similar patterns of marketization? This question proves to be complex because as with sources of income, 
existing state institutions persist at the same time that markets emerge alongside and even within them.
houSehold expendIture
The food economy is a microcosm of the broader institutional and behavioral changes that swept through 
North Korea in the 1990s. Almost one-third of respondents reported having lost a family member 
10. Although one might expect that marketization had proceeded the furthest in the areas bordering China, the results of 
table 2 are consistent with those obtained by Haggard and Noland (2009) that grain prices in the border region were not 
distinctly lower than in other parts of the country.
during the famine, and the grassroots marketization of the economy in the 1990s that began with food 
subsequently spread to other products (Haggard and Noland 2007). In principle, urban residents, about 
two-thirds of the population, were fed via the state-run quantity rationing system, the PDS. Yet fully 28 
percent of urban residents in the sample indicate that they never received food through this channel. 
Among those who indicate that they received food from the PDS, more than 20 percent say it had 
ceased to be the primary source of food by 1993. Within two years, less than half of the respondents were 
obtaining food primarily through the PDS.11 Instead, the market and self-production became the primary 
means of accessing food (figure 3). The fact that so many reported growing their own food is particularly 
revealing given the low share of farmers in the sample, suggesting that even nonagricultural households 
resorted to self-production. The number of respondents relying on the public sector fell further among 
those who left in the immediate post-famine period: Not a single respondent of these 74 said they relied 
primarily on the PDS, and only two reported relying primarily on their workplace. The number of 
respondents relying primarily on the PDS or their workplace increased marginally among those who left 
in the post-retrenchment period; conditional on the underlying characteristics of this smallest subsample, 
this shift could signal some success on the part of the government in reconstituting the PDS. But in both 
of the post-reform subsamples, the dominant answers remain reliance on the market and self-production 
of food. 
A more refined sense of the reliance on the market for food can be obtained by grouping 
respondents by time of departure (figure 4). Both the high level of reliance on the market and the 
persistence of such reliance over time are striking. Nearly 40 percent of urban residents reported having 
purchased all their food in the market, more than half reported purchasing at least 75 percent. Only in 
the final, post-retrenchment subsample does the share not purchasing any food in the market rise above 
10 percent, and fully half of the respondents in this group reported receiving all their food through the 
market. 
Again, we estimated ordered probits for the ordinal response displayed in figure 4 and probits 
on those respondents reporting that they obtained all their food through the market (table 3). As with 
the income regressions, the list of correlates that are not robustly correlated with marketization of 
consumption is long. Neither age, year or “era” of departure from North Korea, time in South Korea 
or third countries, educational attainment, geographical markers, nor political classification matters in 
this regard. The failure of any of the “era” variables to be significantly correlated with the share of food 
obtained in the market (controlling for demographic characteristics) is significant, since it undercuts the 
11. These results hold for the full sample, the post-famine subsample, and the post-reform subsample, demonstrating that 
they are not simply an artifact of sample truncation or censoring associated with early leavers providing relatively early 
dated responses to the question. 10
weak evidence that might be adduced from figure 3 that the state had reconstituted the PDS in the post-
retrenchment period. Rather, the regressions underscore the consistency of involvement in the market 
and the apparent absence of a time trend.12 
Gender is the only robust correlate with marketization of consumption: Women reported 
purchasing a higher share of their consumption from the market and were more likely to get all their food 
from the market. This result may reflect the fact that as a matter of state policy, women were more likely 
to be shed from SOEs, and men were more likely to remain employed. However, this pattern might also 
be an artifact of the household division of labor. If women were responsible for shopping, their answers 
may more accurately reflect real household consumption patterns. If so, the significance of the gender 
variable would be misleading. In the regression on consumption share obtained through the market, 
farmers were less likely to buy food from the market (presumably because they had access to rations at the 
time of the harvest and grew their own food) and workers in SOEs were less likely to get all their food 
from the market. Yet despite these expected differences, the more striking finding is that the centrality 
of the market on the consumption side mirrors the high degree of market involvement with respect to 
income.
Finally, we do the same counterfactual computation of projected national values as we did in the 
case of household income (figure 5). As in the income regressions, there is a statistically insignificant 
tendency for the projected national values to exhibit less market orientation than the raw survey figures. 
evAluAtIon of polIcy
South Korean government statistics indicate that North Korea experienced a cumulative decline of 33 
percent in real per capita income from its peak in 1990. Careful reconstruction of balance of payments 
statistics suggest that the economy bottomed out in 1998 and recovered slowly from 1999 on (Haggard 
and Noland 2008). In July 2002, the government initiated a major policy reform with four components: 
microeconomic policy changes, including alteration of administered prices and wages; macroeconomic 
policy changes, including the introduction of direct taxes; establishment of special economic zones; and 
aid-seeking.13 The government subsequently reversed field starting in 2005, including a failed attempt to 
reconstitute the PDS and new controls on both domestic markets and cross-border exchanges.
As a component of the reforms, North Korean enterprises were instructed that they were 
12. The income regressions in table 2 and the consumption regressions in table 3 were reestimated jointly but did not yield 
appreciably different results and in the interests of brevity are not reported.
13. Three analytically distinct price changes occurred, each with its own political economy implications: changes in relative 
prices and wages, which could be interpreted as an attempt to increase the role of material incentives; a 10-fold increase in 
the price level, which could be interpreted as an attempt to deal with monetary overhang; and ongoing inflation (perhaps 
130 to 140 percent annually between 2002–2005), which was the product of the collapse of fiscal revenue, exacerbated by 
the maintenance of a bloated military—over 1 million troops in a country of perhaps 22 million people.11
responsible for covering their own costs. At the same time, however, the state administratively raised 
wage levels—with certain favored groups such as military personnel, party officials, scientists, and coal 
miners receiving supernormal increases—and continued to maintain an administered price structure, 
which tended to badly lag the inflation in market prices. In the absence of any formal bankruptcy or 
other “exit” mechanism, enterprises squeezed between these conflicting constraints had no prescribed 
way of ceasing operations. Some enterprises remained in operation at extremely low levels of capacity 
utilization—supported by fiscal subsidies or central bank loans. But another tack was for SOEs to engage 
in entrepreneurial activity, either by establishing “funding” and “foreign exchange earning” squads within 
the SOE or by effectively outsourcing entrepreneurship and adjustment via August 3rd activities and other 
more informal variants of it. 
In the agricultural sector, the government increased the procurement prices of grain (to boost the 
volume of food entering the PDS) and at the same time dramatically increased PDS prices to consumers. 
The nominal retail prices of grain rose 40,000 percent or more in the six months following reform. 
However, procurement prices did not keep pace with rising market prices, and anecdotal accounts suggest 
that the policy was not successful in coaxing local supply back into PDS procurement channels.
At the same time that the government was undertaking microeconomic reforms, its inability to 
secure resources from the fraying SOE and cooperative sectors forced it to undertake a fundamental 
fiscal and financial reform. With the central plan crumbling, the government was no longer able to 
raise significant revenue through a “transactions tax” levied through the central plan.14 Unable to 
tax effectively, the government initiated a campaign to sell “People’s Life Bonds” in March 2003, an 
instrument more closely resembling a lottery ticket than a bond as conventionally understood. The 
government then attempted to address its underlying fiscal crisis by moving from the “transactions tax” 
system to direct taxation of enterprises’ profits, as in a market economy. This reform proved highly 
problematic. The enterprises did not have the accounting systems to make this shift feasible nor, for that 
matter, did the state. For 50 years the economy had run on the basis of centrally orchestrated quantity 
planning, not financial accounting of profits and losses. Not until March 2003 was accounting legislation 
enacted, and not until September 2003 was the Tax Collection Agency even organized! Amid this chaos, 
one tack was to push responsibility for tax collection down to local governments that were then supposed 
to share collections with the center. Not surprisingly, it appears that the local authorities were unwilling 
and/or unable to carry out these responsibilities. In sum, rather than “leading” the transition, the reforms 
were responses to the de facto marketization we have described. Raising controlled prices was a response 
14. Lim (2005, 7) quotes a purported internal North Korean document from October 2001 in which Kim Jong-il, who 
took power following the death of his father, Kim Il-sung, in 1994, bemoans the loss of state control over the economy 
and concludes, “Frankly the state has no money, but individuals have two years’ budget worth.”  1
to the emergence of market prices that more accurately reflected real scarcities. The granting of some 
managerial autonomy to SOEs and price incentives to farmers were efforts to coax economic activity 
from the market back into state-controlled entities and channels. And the tax and financial reforms 
clearly reflected the declining ability of the state to access resources through the planning process. In sum, 
“reforms” were motivated in part by efforts to reestablish control. As marketization continued apace, it 
is not surprising that the state lost confidence in the reform effort and reverted to more direct forms of 
economic control.  
An open issue is the degree to which marketization accelerated after the 2002 policy changes, 
which did decriminalize some entrepreneurial coping activity, or whether these modest gains were in fact 
reversed starting in 2005 as the state, made more confident by improving conditions, introduced new 
controls. 
Prior surveys of North Korean refugees reported a decline in “criminal” activities in the post-reform 
period, but they do not document an increase in marketization, which as we have shown from our survey 
continued to operate at a high level (Lee 2007; Chang, Haggard, and Noland 2009). However, a crucial 
question is whether marketization continued apace as a result of the reforms or in spite of them. Figure 6 
reports responses to questions about the business environment from all 196 respondents who engaged in 
private business or market activities, grouped by time of departure. In each case, respondents were asked 
to rate their opinion or belief on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 indicates strong disagreement and 5 indicates 
strong agreement. We report here the combined share of respondents who answered “totally agree” and 
“agree.”
While the results show some differences among those who left North Korea before or during the 
famine, among those who left after the famine, there is virtually no difference between those who left 
before and after the 2002 policy changes. Relative to the famine period, the responses do document an 
increased ease in trading in and accessing legal markets. But these changes are already apparent in the 
post-famine cohort; basic markers do not change much after the introduction of the 2002 reforms or the 
2005 retrenchment. Indeed, a higher number of respondents from each post-famine cohort agrees that 
continuous changes in rules and regulations disrupted market activity and that they had to engage in 
bribery, with 85 percent of respondents in the most recent, post-retrenchment period reporting they had 
to bribe to conduct their commerce.15 Bribery is apparently one response to the state’s attempt to tighten 
controls. 
The respondents were also asked a series of questions designed to identify changing perceptions of 
the most effective pathway to both higher social status and income (figures 7 and 8). When asked about 
15. The high reported response to changing market rules parallels a similar result obtained in a survey of 300 Chinese 
firms doing business in North Korea, where 79 percent of the respondents cited arbitrary changes in rules and regulations 
as a barrier to doing business in North Korea.1
the best way to get ahead in North Korea, officialdom (including government and party) trumped both 
the military and engaging in business, with more than 70 percent of the respondents citing it in all sample 
periods. But “engaging in business” more than doubled, from 8 percent among respondents departing in 
the famine era to 18 percent among those leaving in the post-reform periods.16 
A more striking set of social changes is apparent from a question about “the easiest way to make 
money in North Korea: work hard at assigned job, engage in market activities, engage in corrupt or 
criminal activities, or none of the above?” (figure 8). Although securing a government or party position 
is highly desirable (figure 7), there is no sense that merit is rewarded; only a small—and falling—share 
reported that working hard at one’s assigned job yields fruit (figure 8).17 The most frequent response in all 
three periods—consistently over 65 percent—was that engaging in market activities was the easiest way 
to make money, but a steadily increasing share—approaching 30 percent in the post-reform cohort—saw 
corruption and criminality as the most lucrative career path. 
These results shed important light on the responses to the question about how to get ahead in North 
Korea. Read in conjunction, the answers to these two questions suggest strongly that an official position is 
valuable not because hard work and merit are rewarded but because it provides a platform for engaging in 
business or corrupt or criminal rent extraction. 
Among those who left North Korea after 2002, 81.9 percent (n=122) report awareness of the 
reforms, which is not surprising given the dramatic changes in both nominal and relative prices that 
accompanied them. Of these respondents, most believe that the reforms supported marketization (table 
4). However, by even larger margins, they associate the policy changes with increase in materialism 
(92 percent), corruption (89 percent), and inequality (84 percent). In interpreting these responses, it 
is important to recall that reforms can have wrenching and contradictory effects. On the one hand, the 
policy reforms decriminalized some coping behaviors, presumably reducing the risk premium on these 
activities, a point that is substantiated in table 4. On the other hand, the reforms involved significant 
institutional as well as policy changes and were accompanied by triple-digit inflation.
To probe in more detail the perceived consequences of the reforms, we asked a series of questions 
about the reforms’ effects on particular economic activities. Table 5 reports responses to a set of questions 
posed to respondents who were employed in the agricultural sector about practices at the time of their 
departure relative to the situation 10 years earlier. Comparison of the responses provided by those 
16. Interestingly, despite the proclamation of “military-first” politics, the army declines as a way of getting ahead: While 
institutionally the military may experience rising influence, from an individual standpoint, the largely conscript army is 
not seen as a channel of advancement, with not a single respondent in the most recent subsample citing it as the way to get 
ahead. 
17. Indeed, in the post-reform period only a single respondent believed hard work at an assigned job was the way to 
succeed.1
who left before and after the reforms does suggest a modest increase in the ability to sell products on 
the market (42 and 53 percent, respectively); an attenuation of disagreement with a statement about 
autonomy in decision-making; and an increase in the frequency of rule-changing (which could be good 
or bad).18 Most respondents replied negatively to the bottom line question: “Did you become better off?” 
However, in the post-reform subsample, there was evidence that fewer thought that their situation had 
deteriorated, and at least some thought that it had improved.
A similar set of questions asked to respondents who were employed in SOEs elicited a similar 
pattern of responses: documentation of increased marketization, though not much evidence of an 
acceleration of marketization in the post-reform subsample (table 6). In contrast to the farmers, whose 
terms of trade may have improved following the reforms, even fewer of the previously privileged urban 
proletariat thought that their situation had improved. Indeed, negative responses in the post-reform 
subsample increased slightly, with nearly 4 out of 5 workers disagreeing with the statement that they had 
become better off.  
The responses of government or party office workers to a similar set of questions illuminated 
that marketization reached into the state itself (table 7). Seventy percent of the respondents reported 
their units spending more time on money-making activities outside their traditional duties, and only 
8 percent disagree with this characterization. Even larger margins (82 percent affirmative, 4 percent 
negative) supported the notion that over time public officials became more corrupt, substantiating the 
links between state positions, corruption, and personal advancement observed in the previous section. 
The majority of the respondents agreed with the statement that over time more effort was devoted to 
ideological indoctrination in their offices, as authorities responded to eroding discipline with ideological 
campaigns. Finally, on the bottom line, “you became better off” question, the majority disagreed, but 
the share (58 percent) was much lower than in the rural (66 percent) or SOE (79 percent) sectors, again 
reinforcing the notion that the state held a relatively privileged position.
Table 8 reports ordered probits on the responses to the “you became better off” question. Again, the 
list of variables that are not robustly correlated with the responses is long: sex, age, year of departure from 
North Korea, time in South Korea or third countries, educational attainment, and residence in the capital 
city Pyongyang or in a border province.19 Several robust correlates, however, beginning with departure 
18. The number of those who left “post-retrenchment” is relatively small at the sectoral level and not reported separately.
19. Unlike the results presented in figures 1 and 3, where the responses were to a factual question “what share of your 
income was earned in the market,” the assessment of whether one is better off is inherently more subjective. As a 
consequence we also tried a number of “experiential variables”: whether the respondent had a family member die in the 
famine, whether the respondent knew about the aid program but believed that they had not received aid, whether the 
respondent had been arrested or incarcerated, as well as a number of others. These variables were not robustly correlated 
with the evaluation of whether one had been made better off. Due to the stratification of North Korean society, to a 
certain extent these experiences are bundled, and collinearity across responses meant that one could generate significant 
coefficients on some regressors in particular specifications. For example, if work in a party office was excluded from the 
specification, the coefficient on death of a family member was sometimes significant.1
from North Korea in 2006 or more recently (the “post-retrenchment” era), are positively associated with 
this self-assessment. Employment in an SOE is negatively correlated; state-sector workers did not believe 
that they had fared well under the new order. Professional and merchant occupations are both positively 
correlated with the self-assessment of well-being (regression 8.1). Involvement in the August 3rd program 
and, to a lesser extent, participation in unspecified private activities are negatively correlated with the self-
assessment of well-being (regression 8.2). This result could be regarded as surprising—involvement in the 
market was associated with lower self-assessment of well-being—except that it is important to recall that 
involvement in the market reflects a mix of “opportunity entrepreneurship,” which would presumably 
reflect improved well-being, and “necessity self-employment” by women, for example, involuntarily shed 
from SOE employment. This is consistent with the predictably negative relationship between formal-
sector wages and informal activity obtained in an earlier survey of refugees who departed during the 
pre-reform period (Kim and Song 2008). And not surprisingly, membership in the core class and (less 
strongly) the wavering class are both positively correlated.20 
Tables 5 to 7 depict pervasive disappointment with developments within North Korea. The table 
8 regression results—asking respondents to compare their current situation with their status 10 years 
earlier—indicate that members of the more politically favored classes, professionals, and merchants—i.e., 
those best positioned to exploit emerging opportunities, be they legal or not—are less unhappy than 
most, particularly compared with the industrial proletariat. While the August 3rd workers were the most 
marketized group, some of them were involuntarily shed from SOEs, particularly women. Apparently the 
only thing worse than being an SOE employee is being a redundant SOE employee in a society without 
any real social safety net. It is also striking that in none of the reported regressions, on household income, 
expenditure, or satisfaction, is educational attainment directly correlated with outcomes. Rather, the 
importance of political class and sector suggests a society in which position is paramount and returns to 
human capital quite low.
Crisis-induced marketization has one silver lining. Residence in North or South Hamgyong, 
provinces in the northeast that constitute the North Korean rust belt and by consensus were the areas 
worst-hit by the famine, is positively associated with the self-assessment of improvement in well-being. 
People from the worst-affected regions and those who compared recent experiences with the famine era 
a decade earlier, have marginally more positive assessments. While conditions are bad, the emergence 
of markets has acted as a kind of safety valve most acutely felt in the worst conditions. Obviously, well-
functioning markets supported by appropriate state institutions would be preferable to marketization 
20. It is possible that class and occupation are endogenous to the self-assessment of whether one is better off. As a check, 
the regressions were reestimated replacing the respondent’s class and occupation with their father’s (specifications 8.3 and 
8.4). When these instruments are used, political class no longer is correlated with the assessment of well-being.1
in the absence of institutions, but even irregular markets appear to have an ameliorative effect. But this 
finding has deeper significance, mirroring the results of China’s Great Leap famine (Yang 1996). Areas 
that were hardest hit by the famine also may have experienced the most robust marketization and thus 
may be poised over the long run to be centers of more dynamic growth and de facto reform.
Finally, we do the same counterfactual projection of national values on the basis of the estimated 
coefficients in table 8, converting the mean responses, originally scored on a 1–5 metric, to a 0–100 
scale to generate an “approval rating.” Sample approval ratings are simply the scaled mean score of each 
response variable. To calculate approval ratings, we predict the probability of observing each response 
conditional on estimated national values of each explanatory variable. The predicted probabilities sum 
to one. To estimate the mean response we sum the products of each score and its predicted probability, 
which gives us a probability-weighted mean response. We then convert this value to a 0–100 scale. The 
same procedure is applied to calculate minimum and maximum predicted probabilities of each outcome, 
which are estimated at the 95 percent confidence level and used to establish confidence intervals for each 
response estimate. The results of these predictions are reported in figure 9.
Unlike the previous counterfactual projections on household income and expenditure, there are 
noticeable differences in attitudes derived from the raw survey data and projected national responses, 
though it is not possible to categorically state that the projected national values are different than the 
reported values derived from the sample once the 95 percent confidence interval is taken into account. 
The survey sample marginally overweights demographic groups with less favorable assessments of the 
regime, with the central projected values implying 10 to 15 percentage points higher positive assessments 
by the national population. That said, the projected “approval rating” of the North Korean regime by the 
national population is less than 40 percent in all specifications.
concluSIon
Economists often think of the state playing an enabling role in economic development— providing 
public goods, such as the legal protection of property rights, while the political economy of reform is 
conceived in terms of bargaining over policy among elites or special interest groups. We document a case 
that turns this perspective on its head: efficiency-enhancing institutional and behavioral changes arising 
not out of a conscious, top-down program of reform, but rather as an unintended (and in some respects, 
unwanted) product of state failure. Responses from a survey of North Korean refugees demonstrate 
that the North Korean economy marketized in response to state failure with the onset of famine in 
the 1990s, and subsequent reforms and retrenchments appear to have had remarkably little impact on 
some significant share of the population. There is strong evidence of powerful social changes, including 
increasing inequality, corruption, and changed attitudes about the most effective pathways to higher social 
status and income. These assessments appear to be remarkably consistent across demographic groups. 1
While the survey sample marginally overweights demographic groups with less favorable assessments of 
the regime, even counterfactually recalibrating the sample to match the underlying resident population 
suggests widespread dissatisfaction with the North Korean regime, its capabilities, and accomplishments.
AppendIx
Due to lack of a comprehensive and reliable data source for North Korea, the national-level values used in 
the computation of the counterfactuals were constructed using various sources and techniques. To match 
our sample, data on population between the ages of 15 and 64 were taken from the International Labor 
Organization’s database.21 Female and regional population shares were taken from UNFPA (2009).
For the occupation variables, shares of students and soldiers were calculated from the Korean 
Statistical Information Service (KOSIS) database (available at www.kosis.kr). Data on labor force 
distribution from the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Report 
(2002) were used to assign shares for professionals, government/office workers, farmers, laborers, and 
teachers. The share of merchants was based on an estimate of the number of traders (Gey 2004). The 
share of housewives was represented by the economically inactive female population between the ages 
of 25 and 64 under the assumption that women who are not employed are housewives and that by law 
and practice, women under 25 are not allowed to get married (Hunter 1999). The shares of social class 
variables were calculated by averaging figures from Kim (2000) and Hunter (1999). 
To calculate work unit values, the army and unemployed or retired were assigned the values of 
soldiers and economically nonactive in the KOSIS database. The shares for “state farm or agricultural 
cooperative,” “state owned enterprise (SOE),” and “government or party office” were distributed in the 
same proportion as estimates of agriculture, industry, and the service sector reported in Noland (2000), 
with SOE employment adjusted for August 3rd workers using Gey’s estimate of traders. The remaining 
work unit share was allotted to “other work units.” 
Finally, for the four variables that represent participation in private activities, the total share of 
the population engaged in private activities was set equal to 0.473, the central estimate of national-level 
marketization of the food economy from Haggard and Noland (2007). Estimates of the number of 
individuals engaged in various forms of market activity could then be constructed by assuming that the 
distribution of different types of activity mirrored the refugee sample. 
To model current attitudes, we assumed that residents reflected the views of those who had most 
recently emigrated, i.e., the post-retrenchment departure dummy was set equal to one and the dummies 
for other eras of departure zero. The categorical and binary dependent variables were converted to a 
0–100 scale from which the probability weighted mean responses were calculated.
21. International Labor Organization, LABORSTA Labor Statistics Database, Geneva, available at http://laborsta.ilo.org 
(accessed on July 28, 2009).1
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table 1     engagement in private activities (percent share of those  
  who answered “yes”)
In addition to your work duties, did you ever 
engage in the following activities: respondent Spouse
Private trading  0. 0.
Provision of private services  . 10.
Other private business activities 1. 0.1
August rd unit 1. 1.1
Source: Authors’ calculations.
table 2     household income regressions
Income share from 
private business activities 
(categorical)
All income is from private 
business activities  
(binary)
(2.1) (2.2)
Hometown in provinces bordering China  –0.** –0.*
(N. Pyongan, Jagang, Yanggang and N. Hamgyung)  (0.1) (0.1)
Workunit: state-owned enterprise –0.1** –0.**
(0.) (0.1)
Workunit: state farm or agricultural cooperative –0.0** –0.1
(0.) (0.0)
Workunit: government or party office –0.** –0.*
(0.0) (0.)
Workunit: army –0.** –1.10***
(0.) (0.)
Workunit: unemployed or retired –0. –0.00
(0.) (0.0)




Number of observations 00 00
P-value 0.010 0.00
Chi-squared 1. 1.
Log likelihood –. –1.
Pseudo R-squared 0.010 0.00
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.0, * p<0.1
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations.1
table 3     household expenditure regressions 
Share of family’s consumption of food 
purchased on the market (categorical) 
100 percent of family’s consumption of food 
was purchased on the market (binary)
(3.1) (3.2)  (3.3)  (3.4)  (3.5) (3.6) 
Female 0.1*** 0.0*** 0.** 0.0*** 0.0*** 0.**
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Occupation: professional  –0. –0.0 –0.1* –0.01











Occupation: farmer –0. –0.* –0.1 –0.
(0.) (0.) (0.) (0.1)
Occupation: merchant –0. –0.0 –0. –0.
(0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.)
Occupation: housewife –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.
(0.1) (0.) (0.) (0.)
Occupation: student –0.1 –0.0 –0. –0.*
(0.) (0.) (0.1) (0.)
Occupation: laborer –0.1 –0. –0. –0.0
(0.) (0.0) (0.0) (0.)
Occupation: teacher –0. –0.0 –0.01 –0.
(0.1) (0.) (0.) (0.01)
Occupation: soldier –0. 0.10 –0.1 –0.
(0.01) (0.) (0.) (0.)
Workunit: state–owned enterprise  









Workunit: August rd unit of an  









Workunit: state farm or agricultural   









Workunit: army  –0. –0. –0. –0.0
(0.1) (0.0) (0.) (0.1)






















Number of observations 00 00 00 00 00 00
P–value 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0010 0.0 0.01
Chi–squared 1. 1. 0.0 .1 1. 0.01
Log likelihood –. –.0 –0. –11.0 –1. –1.1
Pseudo R–squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.0
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.0, * p<0.1
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations.




















The reforms allowed more people 
to trade in the market
. . 1. 0.0 1. . 1. 10.
The reforms increased the amount  
of goods in the market
. 1. 1.1 . .0 1. 1. 10.
The reforms increased the amount  
of food in the market
. . 1.1 . . 1. 0. 10.
After the reforms, people started  
to care only about money
. . . 1. . 0.0 0.0 .
After the reforms, corruption  
increased
1. . . 1. . . . .1
As a result of the reforms, society 
became more unequal
. . . . . . .1 .
Source: Authors’ calculations.

table 5     pre- and post-reform perceptions of agricultural policies (percent)
relative to conditions 10 years earlier, 
at the time of your departure: 













The cooperative or farm had more control 
over planting decisions
1. 1. .1 1. . 1. . 10.
There was greater availability of inputs 
such as fertilizer
. . . . 11. . . .
The government or coop managers 
seemed to take more and more grain  
from the cooperative each year
. . 1. . 1. .0 11. 1.
You had more access to land to grow what 
you wanted
1. . . . . 1. 0 .
You had more opportunity to trade farm 
products on the market
1. . . 1. . . 1. 1.
The government changed the rules  
more often
0 1. . . . .1 . 10.
You became better off  . 0. 1. .1 1. 1. . 0.0
Source: Authors’ calculations.
table 6     pre- and post-reform perceptions of state-owned enterprise reforms (percent)
relative to conditions 10 years 
earlier, at the time of your departure: 





















More of your enterprise’s output was  
sold on the market
. . 0. . .   .
More of your work was done outside  
the enterprise
. 10. 1. . . 10. 1. .1
People did not seem to work as hard for  
the work unit as in the past
. 1. . 0.0 .1 10. 10. .1
My factory was involved in market  
activities outside the plan
. 1. 1. . . 1. 1. .
The quality of social services at my work   
unit declined
.1 1 . . . 10. .1 0.0
The government changed the rules  
more often
. . . 1. . .1 0.0 1.
You became better off . 1. .1 . . 10. . .1
Source: Authors’ calculations.
table 7     Government and party office perceptions of reform trends (percent)
relative to conditions 10 years earlier, at 
the time of your departure: 





















Over time, more effort was spent on  
ideological and propaganda work in  
our office
. 1.  . 0 0. . 11.
Over time, corruption by public officials  
and high-ranking officers increased
. . . 0.0 . . . 11.
Over time, our office/unit devoted more  
time to money-making activities not  
directly related to our official or  
traditional responsibilities
. 1. 1. . .1 1. . .
Our office competed against other  
government, party, military organizations  
in money-making activities
. . 1. 1. . . 1. 1.
The government changed the rules  
more often
1.  1. 0. . . . .
You became better off 1. 1. . . 1. .1 . .
Source: Authors’ calculations.

table 8     Self–assessed improvement regressions
you became better off 
(categorical)
you became better off 
(categorical)
(8.1)  (8.2)  (8.3)  (8.4) 
Post–famine period –0.10 –0.10 Post–famine period –0.01 –0.1
(1~00)  (0.0) (0.1) (1~00)  (0.0) (0.11)
Post–reform period –0.00 0.010 Post–reform period –0.0 –0.01
(00~00)  (0.1) (0.10) (00~00)  (0.1) (0.1)
Post–retrenchment period 0.** 0.* Post–retrenchment period 0.* 0.
(00~)  (0.) (0.0) (00~)  (0.) (0.)
Worked at a state–owned enterprise at  
   the time you left North Korea
–0.0*** –0.10*** Worked at a state–owned enterprise at 
the time you left North Korea
–0.*** –0.1***
(0.1) (0.1) (0.10) (0.1)
Worked in the government, party office,  
   or military at the time you left North  
   Korea
0.1 0.10 Worked in the government, party office, 
or military at the time you left North 
Korea
0. 0.1
(0.) (0.) (0.1) (0.1)
Hometown in Far Northeast provinces  0.0** 0.1** Hometown in Far Northeast provinces  0.** 0.**
(North and South Hamgyung)  (0.1) (0.1) (North and South Hamgyung)  (0.1) (0.1)
Class: core 0.*** 0.0*** Father’s class: core 0.11 0.1
(0.00) (0.0) (0.) (0.)
Class: wavering 0.*** 0.** Father’s class: wavering 0.0 0.11
(0.) (0.) (0.1) (0.)
Class: hostile 0.0 0. Father’s class: hostile –0.0 –0.0
(0.1) (0.) (0.) (0.)
Participated in private trading –0.10 Participated in private trading –0.11
(0.10) (0.11)
Participated in providing private services 0.0 Participated in providing private services 0.
(0.) (0.)
Participated in other private business  
   activities




Participated in August rd unit activities –0.1*** Participated in August  unit activities –0.***
(0.1) (0.1)
(table continues on next page)

table 8     Self–assessed improvement regressions (continued)
you became better off 
(categorical)
you became better off 
(categorical)
(8.1)  (8.2)  (8.3)  (8.4) 
Occupation: professional  0.** 0.1** Father’s occupation: professional  0.** 0.**
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.10)










Occupation: farmer 0.01 –0.0 Father’s occupation: farmer –0.0 –0.0
(0.) (0.) (0.0) (0.)
Occupation: merchant 0.* 0.1** Father’s occupation: merchant 0.0 0.0
(0.0) (0.11) (0.0) (0.)
Occupation: housewife 0.1 0.1
(0.) (0.)
Occupation: student –0.0 –0.1
(0.) (0.)
Occupation: laborer 0.00 0.0 Father’s occupation: laborer –0.1 –0.1
(0.) (0.) (0.) (0.)
Occupation: teacher  0. 0.00 Father’s occupation: teacher 0.1 0.0
(0.) (0.) (0.0) (0.)
Occupation: soldier 0.1 0.1 Father’s occupation: soldier –0.1 –0.11
(0.) (0.) (0.) (0.)
Number of observations   Number of observations  
P–value 0.0001 .e–0 P–value 0.0011 .e–0
Chi–squared . .10 Chi–squared . .0
Log likelihood –. –1. Log likelihood –. –1.
Pseudo R–squared 0.0 0.01 Pseudo R–squared 0.0 0.0
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.0, * p<0.1
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations.













Famine Era Post-famine Period  Post-reform Period  Post-retrenchment Period
None of our household income came from private business activities





All of our income came from private business activities
  famine era  post-famine period  post-reform period  post-retrenchment period
none of our household income came from private business activities




more than  percent
all of our income came from private business activities

Source:  Authors’ calculations.
figure 2     Share of total income that came from private business activities:  













  sample  national  sample  national
  (regression .1)  (regression .)
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
























bought it in a market























Source:  Authors’ calculations.























  famine era  post-famine period  post-reform period  post-retrenchment period  full urban sample

purchased no food in the market
less than  percent
–0 percent
0– percent
more than  percent






















Source:  Authors’ calculations.
figure 5     Share of family’s consumption of food purchased on the market: sample  


















































































  sample  national  sample  national  sample  national  sample  national  sample  national  sample  national
  (regression .1)  (regression .)  (regression .)  (regression .)  (regression .)  (regression .)
Source:  Authors’ calculations.0
figure 6     perceptions of the business environment for market and private activities (share of  











































it had become easier over time to engage in private trading
I was unable to trade in legal markets
government officials were able to control the prices of things I sell
the government frequently changed the rules governing market activities
I had to pay bribes to engage in private activity
Source:  Authors’ calculations.





















    famine era  post-famine period  post-reform period  post-retrenchment period
become a government or party official
join the army
engage in business
 none of the above

Source:  Authors’ calculations.1




















    famine era  post-famine period  post-reform period  post-retrenchment  
        period
work hard at assigned job
engage in market activities
engage in corrupt or criminal activities
none of the above

Source:  Authors’ calculations.
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  sample  national  sample  national  sample  national  sample  national
  (regression .1)  (regression .)  (regression .)  (regression .)
Source:  Authors’ calculations.